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Hybrid funds have almost quadrupled since 2003. This is puzzling given that prior research has 
found no evidence of hybrid funds outperforming passive products. Using data on the 
American market there is evidence of positive alphas and hybrid funds outperforming active 
funds after fees, mainly given to market timing ability. Hybrid funds trade more when they 
find short-term opportunities of profit but those that have higher turnover are not the best 
performing. Finally, there is no conclusive evidence that investors invest more on hybrid funds 
just because of their classification, without taking other characteristics into account.  
 


























Since 2010 that passive mutual funds have had larger capital inflows than active funds on a 
yearly basis. In fact, over the past four years, while active funds lost capital, passive 
investments received record capital inflows. Over the course of 2016, active funds had net 
outflows of $340.1 billion against $504.8 billion net inflows to passive funds (Morningstar 
Direct Asset Flows Commentary, 2017). 
While some investment managers trade actively to achieve alfa, many believe these funds do 
not provide positive risk-adjusted returns after-fees. The simple doubt on the performance of 
active funds, allied with relatively high management fees has led investors to tilt their portfolios 
into cheaper passive and semi-passive investments. Among these, exchange traded funds 
(ETF’s) and index funds are the most commonly used. While ETF’s have been broadly studied, 
two specific types of index funds have not: enhanced index funds (EIF) and index based funds 
(IBF). These can be called hybrid funds since they provide a mix between active and passive 
investment. Table 1 shows the evolution of these hybrid funds and their traditional counterparts 
on the United States (US) market. 
Table 1 - Evolution of the Industry in the United States 
Active Hybrid Passive Active Hybrid Passive
2003 36	016															 574															 1	620										 34	334	849						 319	543									 3	013	410									
2004 37	713															 1	196												 2	993										 40	838	173						 817	601									 6	517	106									
2005 40	255															 1	238												 3	380										 47	297	971						 1	034	195						 7	959	956									
2006 43	500															 1	238												 3	940										 56	116	332						 1	341	312						 9	825	006									
2007 44	392															 1	315												 4	849										 65	910	107						 1	706	535						 12	399	033							
2008 43	864															 1	537												 5	342										 56	909	945						 1	702	388						 11	792	118							
2009 42	184															 1	781												 5	477										 47	049	685						 1	733	755						 10	757	537							
2010 41	911															 1	926												 5	689										 57	220	478						 2	355	222						 13	925	210							
2011 40	458															 2	190												 5	859										 63	338	174						 2	950	626						 17	245	804							
2012 38	575															 2	113												 5	787										 64	391	906						 3	348	840						 19	573	316							
2013 36	879															 2	181												 5	674										 73	264	367						 4	420	780						 24	860	262							
2014 36	116															 2	191												 5	575										 81	528	661						 5	302	729						 30	568	410							
2015 35	316															 2	105												 5	593										 81	172	705						 5	525	803						 34	341	042							
2016 33	937															 2	058												 5	512										 76	287	511						 5	429	353						 36	373	551							
Panel	B:	Evolution	of	Total	Net	Assets	(in	M	$)Panel	A:	Evolution	of	Number	of	Funds
 
Hybrid funds have almost quadrupled between 2003 and 2016. They are passive in the sense 
that they attempt to weakly follow a given benchmark index but active as they have freedom 
to manage positions, moving away from the benchmark while maintaining a low tracking error. 
In an EIF, to do so, different strategies are employed: enhanced cash by using futures and other 
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derivatives; buying fixed income instruments; allowing for short-selling and leverage; filtering 
some stocks or rebalancing towards lower cap stocks; or even tax-enhancement. An IBF is a 
very similar instrument that has further freedom to invest outside of the main index it follows. 
Otherwise, they are equal as they will become active when an opportunity arises. 
Although hybrid funds seem very good and are perceived by Deloitte and PwC as the future of 
investing (Deloitte, 2016; PwC, 2017), many academics did not find evidence of them 
performing significantly above their benchmarks. In fact, after fees, some show these hybrid 
funds underperform the index they are based on (Riepe & Werner, 1998; Weng & Wang, 2017). 
This result is intriguing given that investors are increasingly channeling capital inflows towards 
these financial products. It then seems that a more detailed and updated study is needed, one 
that uses a larger set of data and that studies the biggest and most efficient market: the US. 
This thesis is set to analyze the performance of hybrid funds while comparing them to active 
and passive investments. It is important to figure out if these hybrid funds are indeed semi-
passive funds that become active when they see a good opportunity that adds value, or if this 
is just pure marketing that increases inflows to the fund. If these funds add value, understanding 
if it comes from positive market timing or stock picking skills can be crucial for investors to 
select which funds are likely to enhance returns over the benchmark and better to include on 
their portfolios. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to discover if hybrid funds provide the right 
mix between active and passive funds, outperforming other types of funds or if they are purely 
a marketing move aimed at increasing inflows and fees for the management of the fund. 
This study would contribute to the scarce literature on these specific hybrid funds, which are 
an increasingly used financial instrument, on their performance, in order to solve the puzzle of 
their growth. Contrary to previous studies, this thesis will use the largest dataset to date, 
focused on the US market. This study would also provide further insights on the main 
characteristics and drivers of EIF and IBF performance, ability to time the market and to pick 
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stocks, to help investors understand a priori which funds are likely to perform better. Finally, 
it would shed light on the relationship between these funds and the market and the relationship 
of investors with these funds by studying turnover-performance and flow data. 
This study finds that hybrid funds indeed outperform passive and active products and are good 
market timers. The outperformance over active funds is due to lower fees. There is evidence 
that replacing traditional products by hybrid funds will improve the returns of a portfolio. 
Furthermore, they are truly hybrid in the sense that they do not deviate significantly from the 
benchmark. It also discovers that these funds find and profit from short-term opportunities that 
have returns materialized on the same month but the funds that trade more are not necessarily 
the best performing. Finally, there is no conclusive proof that investors invest more on a fund 
after it markets itself as a hybrid fund, without changes on the fundamentals of the fund.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes relevant points in 
the literature and guides the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the dataset, basic 
summary statistics and the methodology employed to get to the final dataset. The next section 
lays down the empirical design. Section 5 describes the results and the final section concludes 
with suggestions for further improvement. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The first doubts on how well do active funds perform were raised by Jensen (1968). The author 
found that, on average, funds underperformed the market with an alpha of -0.011 net of fees, 
the measure he applied to financial performance. Other more recent studies propose different 
alpha measures that continue to be used until today (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993). 
While some studies advocate that active management adds value for investors, many believe 
this is not true after fees. Fama and French (2010) go a step further in stating that skill does not 
exist as the best funds are no better than efficiently managed passive funds.  
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Active funds have higher expenses which, ceteris paribus, lower the fund’s net return for 
investors. However, funds with higher expenses may have better gross performance, and net 
performance as well, as these can signal the presence of good managerial skill (Ferreira, 
Keswani, Miguel, & Ramos, 2013). Furthermore, high transaction costs also harm the fund’s 
performance, although they may be caused by larger turnover deriving from the search of better 
opportunities.  
While the active fund industry is widely studied, passive funds only started receiving more 
attention recently. Their popularity across investors is growing as cheaper funds that are able 
to properly diversify portfolios. Passive investments have lower costs and their returns should 
not be overlooked. Malkiel (1995, 2013) is one of the most critical voices against active funds 
and in favor of passive management. He shows that active funds have expenses that are 
excessively high and did not find a significant positive relationship between expenses and gross 
returns, as other studies did. Carhart (1997) also shows that mutual funds are not able to 
consistently outperform the benchmark and Berk and Green (2004) developed a model based 
on decreasing returns to scale such that, as a fund becomes larger, return is likely to worsen so 
it explains the lack of persistence in returns. Even Warren Buffett, the most successful active 
investor, has advised his wife to buy passive products, according to the Berkshire Hathaway 
Annual Report (2013). 
Nevertheless, passive funds also have some deficiencies that could be solved. For instance, 
pure index funds suffer from dramatically increased transaction costs during index changes. 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) showed that index managers had execution costs 0.45% higher 
than value traders. This makes sense since value traders invest actively according to the long 
term fundamental value of a stock so they do not need immediate completion of their orders, 
allowing them to use more limit orders – ensures price but not completion/quickness of the 
order - than indexers.  
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Hybrid funds, which address the abovementioned concerns, have rarely been studied. This also 
seems a puzzle given that a hybrid fund is found to be more efficient than a combination of 
pure active and passive funds (DiBartolomeo, 2000). Furthermore, the few papers on the 
performance of hybrid funds have either a small sample or are directed towards a specific small 
market. The first study on the performance of hybrid funds showed no signs of a positive alpha 
for eight S&P500 enhanced index funds (Riepe & Werner, 1998). Weng and Wang (2017) 
studied twenty nine Chinese enhanced index funds and found evidence that EIFs perform worse 
than their benchmarks after fees. 
In terms of manager characteristics, Weng and Wang (2017) find that managers with education 
or work experience outside of China perform better in hybrid funds, while previous experience 
in other areas harms the performance of the fund. Contrary to human capital theory, higher fees 
do not translate into better returns. 
In order for these funds to be truly considered hybrid, they must be able to closely follow a 
benchmark, otherwise an investor would prefer an active fund. This would mean that measures 
of deviation from a benchmark, such as the active share and tracking error, of hybrid funds 
should be lower than those of active funds but higher than pure index funds. 
Hypothesis I – Hybrid funds maintain a low tracking error and low active share when 
compared to active funds 
Using a small sample of 5 pure index funds and 3 enhanced index funds, Frino, Gallagher and 
Oetomo (2005) analyze the funds’ trades and strategy. As expected, EIFs begin rebalancing 
earlier than other funds, leading to higher tracking error, and for index inclusions, they finish 
trading after other indexed funds. Additionally, EIFs do smaller trading orders and wait longer 
before completion, primarily to decrease transaction costs but also to enjoy temporary positive 
returns associated with the index adjustments that pure index funds are unable to get.  
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These studies are not performed in the biggest market, the US, and have small sets of data. 
Despite previous literature, since investors are still pursuing these hybrid funds, either by 
replacing active or passive portions of their portfolio, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they 
outperform the benchmark and active money management. This would imply that previous 
literature is wrong due to the small and specific datasets used. 
 Hypothesis II – Hybrid funds outperform their benchmark and similar active funds 
Investing in EIFs, instead of a portfolio with a combination of active and passive funds, will 
“reduce transaction costs, avoid capitalization biases, and provide better utilization of manager 
forecasting skill” (DiBartolomeo, 2000). However, EIF managers seem to be poor stock 
pickers and average market timers, a result consistent for all risk-adjusted measures. Taking 
extreme periods where the market has returns above 10% or below -10% into consideration, 
there are no conclusive results. When the return is between 10% and -10%, the poor stock 
picking skills are confirmed and managers seem to time the market well (Weng & Wang, 2017). 
It would make sense that the greatest value added from these hybrid funds comes from general 
knowledge of market conditions, that allow them to hedge, especially when their benchmark is 
more exposed to downturns. 
 Hypothesis III – Hybrid funds are average stock pickers  
 Hypothesis IV – Hybrid funds are good market timers 
Hybrid funds hold a larger portion of futures and instruments other than equity on their 
portfolios (Frino et al., 2005). They overweight stocks that have higher liquidity, higher market 
capitalization, better past performance and underweight low book-to-market. Some hybrid 
funds, the index based funds, hold positions outside of the benchmark. Frino, Gallagher and 
Oetomo (2005) found these to provide significant positive returns (0.13% daily), an impressive 
figure taking into account that the portion of their holdings different from the index is minimal.  
 7 
Existing literature also relates deviation from a benchmark with performance. Using an “active 
share” measure, which compares the holdings of a fund with the holdings of its benchmark, 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that funds that deviate more from the benchmark - that have 
a higher active share - perform better than other funds. On a different level, a similar cross-
sectional relation is not corroborated by Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2017) that find a 
positive, but not significant, relationship between fund turnover and gross returns. However, 
these authors are able to find a statistically and economically significant relationship between 
these two variables in a time series. This supports the idea that when a fund starts trading more, 
it is doing so to take advantage of perceived opportunities that will lead to improved future 
returns.  
Hypothesis V – Hybrid funds trade more when they perceive an opportunity 
Berk and Green (2004) created a model that seems to explain well why do some funds receive 
more capital inflows. Talent is rewarded with inflows but as the fund becomes larger, 
decreasing returns to scale happen due to liquidity constraints, higher transaction costs and 
because the market will monitor more closely its trades. 
Cronqvist (2006) shows that marketing and advertising increase the flows entering a fund 
without signaling manager ability. Academics find that loads and 12b-1 fees, both proxies for 
marketing quality, are statistically significant and positive predictors of flows (Barber, Odean, 
& Zheng, 2005; Elton, Gruber, & Busse, 2004; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). All in all, initiatives that 
market the fund as a source of higher returns, such as labelling itself an “enhanced index” or a 
“hybrid” fund should increase capital inflows. 
 Hypothesis VI – Inflows increase after a fund names itself a hybrid fund 
 
3. Data, Methodology and Summary Statistics 
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund 
database, accessed through the Wharton Research Data Services, is the main used source of 
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data. It keeps track of open-ended funds in the US, still in existence and closed, which solves 
the well-documented problem of survivorship bias which happens when only the funds that 
never disappeared are considered, inflating the average return of the market because the 
surviving funds are almost always the best performing among its competitors. However, it is 
worth noting that two biases still remain and should be addressed: (1) some historic returns 
may be duplicated since some funds are split (2) selection and incubation bias on some funds 
that started as private funds – these can report their historical returns before becoming public, 
while the ones who closed cannot.  
The CRSP Mutual Fund database reports observations at the share-class level. Since 2003 that 
CRSP identifies if a fund is an index fund, hence that is the starting point for our analysis. 
Monthly panel data for each share-class from 2003 until 2016 was gathered, a recent dataset 
which eliminates the concern from the first abovementioned bias. From the CRSP tools there 
are monthly returns - after fees, commissions and expenses but before loads -, excess market 
return over the risk-free rate, risk-free rate, small-minus-big (SMB) factor, high-minus-low 
(HML) factor, up-minus-down (UMD) factor, risk-free rate, total net assets (TNA), date of first 
offer and management fund identification code. Also from CRSP, fund summary data was 
gathered on the fund name, index fund flag, turnover ratio, Lipper tax code, and Lipper 
objective code as well as fee data on 12b-1 fees, rear loads, front loads, management fees and 
expense ratio. Data on active share comes from the database developed on previous literature 
by Martijn Cremers (Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, & Starks, 2016; Cremers & Petajisto, 2009). 
This lead to 4 442 178 panel observations that will be treated on Stata and MatLab. 
The CRSP database has some reporting issues that must be addressed. Observations without 
returns were dropped. Values of 0.999 or -99 on 12b-1 fees or loads mean that the fund cannot 
have these and were replaced by a fee equal to 0. Fund summary data has quarterly frequency, 
so data had to be carried forward, for each share-class, of a given quarter for the next two 
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months of the same quarter. Active share data was only available on a yearly basis so the same 
was done, assuming the active share remained constant for all months of that given year. 
Some funds, such as currency, mortgage-backed, balanced, fixed income and foreign equity 
funds as classified in the Lipper code, were excluded for not being relevant for the analysis on 
hybrid funds1. All funds with less than 38 observations were dropped so that, at least, there are 
36 observations for each fund’s rolling windows alpha estimation after dropping a maximum 
of two observations without quarterly data2. Additionally, funds with TNA lower than 15M$ 
were dropped to solve possible reporting errors or different conventions, even though this bias 
is smaller now that NASDAQ also discloses returns for these smaller funds (Amihud & 
Goyenko, 2013; Elton, Blake, & Gruber, 1996). These two measures also allow to partially 
address Evans (2010) incubation bias concerns, also stated previously. To tackle it more 
effectively, observations that happen before the fund’s origin year are dropped, according to 
the author’s advice, an approach also followed by Amihud & Goyenko (2013) and Cremers & 
Petajisto (2009)3. 
Finally, CRSP reports observations at the share-class level: it splits between shares with 
different characteristics, despite having the same underlying fund. The object of study of this 
paper is at the fund level, so share-classes were collapsed month by month into funds using 
MFLINKS, which associates the CRSP identifier number to a given fund and was first 
developed by Wermers (2000). If a fund has multiple share classes, these will be aggregated in 
the following way: logarithm of TNA and flows using the sum of all classes; age, loads and 
12b-1 fees will be the maximum value among them; factors, expense and turnover ratios, 
                                                
1 These will be included later as an extension to the primary analysis. 
2 If data on a fund starts on January, for instance, since the characteristics are reported quarterly starting on March, 
there is no data for the first two months so these observations will be dropped. 
3 Another suggested solution is to drop all funds that do not have a reported fund name on CRSP. It will not be 
done since it would decrease to half the total number of observations and would cause collinearity. Furthermore, 
one could also exclude the first 36 observations of all funds, but that would also decrease dramatically the size of 
the sample, removing all observations between the beginning of 2003 and the end of 2005. 
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management fee, returns are aggregated using a weighted average using TNA as weights. All 
remaining variables are equal across share-classes so the first observation is used. 
Numerical variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to exclude possible outliers 
and to deal with data measurement errors that may still subsist. In the end, the dataset is left 
with 632 632 monthly fund-level observations ranging from March 2003 until the end of 2016. 
Table 2 shows basic descriptive statistics on the studied variables. 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max
activeshare_sd 0,7983 0,1385 0,1627 0,9970 0,4154 0,2511 0,0314 0,9701 0,4650 0,2563 0,0314 0,9664 0,1839 0,2553 0,0314 0,9970
activeshare_min 0,7553 0,1468 0,1627 0,9775 0,3955 0,2301 0,0280 0,9414 0,4477 0,2493 0,0280 0,9368 0,1585 0,2157 0,0280 0,9434
actual_12b1 0,0062 0,0037 0,0000 0,0100 0,0049 0,0035 0,0003 0,0100 0,0030 0,0031 0,0001 0,0100 0,0036 0,0030 0,0001 0,0100
age 24,465 13,908 9 75 17,826 4,2047 9 26 18,550 4,5979 10 29 19,775 6,1715 9 41
exp_ratio 0,0120 0,0033 0,0016 0,0230 0,0115 0,0045 0,0041 0,0223 0,0088 0,0059 0,0009 0,0230 0,0055 0,0040 0,0009 0,0230
familylogtna 9,4066 2,1541 3,4012 13,870 9,3321 1,0567 4,3360 11,824 9,4475 2,6258 3,4874 13,870 9,5415 1,6914 4,5737 13,870
familysize 25,243 31,286 1 213 27,291 14,452 2 76 29,868 28,236 2 97 25,717 19,043 1 97
flows -0,1517 1,1240 -4,6891 2,1164 -0,1624 0,8196 -4,6891 1,8929 0,0142 0,9140 -4,6891 2,1164 -0,0466 0,9319 -4,6891 2,1164
front_load 0,0004 0,0037 0 0,0575 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0000 0,0007 0 0,0100
rear_load 0,0000 0,0008 0 0,0200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
logtna 6,4167 1,5895 2,8094 10,108 5,1602 0,9743 2,8094 6,9112 6,0677 1,7769 2,8094 8,9100 6,4651 1,4752 2,8094 10,108
mgmt_fee 0,7296 0,2400 -16,182 1,6437 0,5994 0,2423 -1,7940 1,3150 0,4880 0,3478 0,0550 1,9030 0,2390 0,2232 -0,3730 1,2160
te 0,0148 0,0067 0,0022 0,0562 0,0107 0,0099 0,0032 0,0572 0,0117 0,0070 0,0015 0,0314 0,0087 0,0076 0,0010 0,0572
turn_ratio 0,7266 0,6081 0,0200 5,5700 1,4443 1,2475 0,1100 5,5700 0,9909 1,2675 0,0200 5,5700 0,5111 1,2098 0,0200 5,5700
mret 0,0075 0,0450 -0,1281 0,1215 0,0083 0,0490 -0,1281 0,1215 0,0091 0,0455 -0,1281 0,1215 0,0082 0,0436 -0,1281 0,1215
OAR 0,0020 0,0143 -0,0478 0,0525 0,0004 0,0145 -0,0478 0,0525 -0,0014 0,0136 -0,0478 0,0525 -0,0005 0,0081 -0,0478 0,0525
alphacapm -0,0006 0,0031 -0,0112 0,0117 -0,0012 0,0029 -0,0112 0,0117 -0,0007 0,0022 -0,0083 0,0057 -0,0003 0,0019 -0,0095 0,0115
alphach -0,0007 0,0026 -0,0118 0,0102 -0,0016 0,0022 -0,0102 0,0102 -0,0009 0,0018 -0,0103 0,0046 -0,0004 0,0012 -0,0073 0,0077
alphaff -0,0006 0,0028 -0,0126 0,0107 -0,0015 0,0023 -0,0101 0,0107 -0,0008 0,0019 -0,0126 0,0046 -0,0003 0,0012 -0,0098 0,0068
grossalphacapm 0,0117 0,0045 -0,0009 0,0246 0,0102 0,0039 0,0020 0,0246 0,0083 0,0056 -0,0009 0,0235 0,0052 0,0044 -0,0009 0,0246
grossalphaff 0,0117 0,0043 -0,0007 0,0240 0,0099 0,0037 0,0022 0,0240 0,0082 0,0053 -0,0006 0,0234 0,0052 0,0040 -0,0005 0,0221




4. Empirical Design 
4.1 Hybrid Funds and their mandate 
First, it is important to determine if hybrid funds stay true to their mandate: to be allowed to 
deviate from a benchmark to succeed on finding profit opportunities (Green & Jame, 2011). 
However, if they to do in such a way that is similar to active funds, the name “hybrid” no longer 
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makes sense. It would be a marketing move to take advantage of a market niche because, in 
reality, they would simply be active funds. 
Deviation from a benchmark is traditionally measured using the tracking error, which is the 
standard deviation of the residuals of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), shown in 
Equation 1, a regression of excess returns on the excess return of the market as explained in 
Cremers & Petajisto (2009) and Zambrana & Zapatero (2015). These authors argue that the 
tracking error is not a good measure of deviation from a benchmark. 
𝑟",$ − 𝑟&,$ = 𝛼)*+,,"$ + 𝛽,/+,"$. (𝑟2,$	– 𝑟&,$)	                                (1) 
Tracking error is related to diversification, not just to the share of the portfolio that is equal to 
the benchmark. This means that the tracking error does not show fund activity, as a fund that 
invests in many components of different indices will have a low tracking error, because it is 
well diversified, although it invests in many assets outside of the benchmark. To solve this, 
Cremers & Petajisto (2009) created the active share measure, which is the “fraction of the 
portfolio that is different from the benchmark index”. It solves the abovementioned problem 
of tracking error, so although both measures to define active management will be used, the 
active share measure is more likely to provide an accurate result. Amihud and Goyenko (2013) 
use the R2 of a benchmark regression to proxy for active management but it does not add 
significant differences from tracking error and active share. 
To study differences in active management among active, passive and hybrid funds, a simple 
t-test to the difference of means of active share and tracking error, winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles, will be performed. 
4.2 Hybrid Funds versus Passive Investments 
To study the second hypotheses, if hybrid funds outperform the benchmark, an alpha for each 
fund will be computed using the models of Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997), shown in Equations 1-3 respectively. A positive alpha is a sign of outperformance over 
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a benchmark. Showing, through a t-test, if the alphas of hybrid funds are positive and 
statistically significant will confirm this hypothesis. 
𝑟",$ − 𝑟&,$ = 𝛼66,"$ + 𝛽,/+,"$. 𝑟2,$	– 𝑟&,$ + 𝛽7,8,"$. 𝑆𝑀𝐵$ + 𝛽<,=,"$. 𝐻𝑀𝐿$         (2) 
𝑟",$ − 𝑟&,$ = 𝛼)<,"$ + 𝛽,/+,"$. 𝑟2,$	– 𝑟&,$ + 𝛽7,8,"$. 𝑆𝑀𝐵$ + 𝛽<,=,"$. 𝐻𝑀𝐿$ + 𝛽@,A,"$. 𝑈𝑀𝐷$    (3) 
,where rm,t - rf,t is the excess return of the market over the risk-free rate (market risk premium 
– MRP); SMB is a portfolio of stocks that goes long on firms with small market capitalization 
and short on stocks with big market capitalization; HML is a portfolio of stocks that goes long 
on firms with high book-to-market ratios and short on firms with low book-to-market ratios 
and UMD is a portfolio of stocks that goes long on stocks that have been having a positive 
return trend and short on stocks that have been having a negative return trend, relating it to a 
momentum strategy. 
4.3 Hybrid Funds versus Active Investments 
To check if hybrid funds are better than otherwise similar active products, a time series of 
rolling windows alphas has to be estimated. These alphas are the relevant performance 
measures after fees so they will be the dependent variable on the regression that tests the effect 
on performance of being a hybrid fund, when including hybrid and active funds. The alphas 
will be net of fees, that uses monthly return net of expenses, and also the gross alpha, that 
utilizes the return before expenses4, using Equations 1-3. 
The independent variables are a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the fund is a hybrid fund 
and 0 if it is an active fund, plus some controls. Put simply, this dummy variable will show if 
the alphas of hybrid funds are higher than the alphas of active funds. From the descriptive 
statistics of Table 2, it seems that characteristics are correlated with the type of fund. For 
                                                
4 As an extension, for all types of funds, the objective adjusted return (OAR) will also be computed. It is equal to 
the difference between the monthly net return and the median of monthly net returns of funds with the same style, 
as reported by the Lipper code. This is similar to the measure used in Khorana & Servaes (1999) and Evans (2010) 
which adjust returns to the style of the fund. 
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instance, it seems that hybrid funds are the youngest, the smallest, have lower front and rear 
loads and have the highest turnover. Active funds are the most expensive, have larger outflows, 
larger loads, are inside the smallest management families - a family is the management 
company that sells different funds - in number of funds and TNA, largest tracking error and 
active share. Passive funds have larger inflows, lower tracking error and active share, while the 
hybrid funds fall in-between the other two groups. Therefore, the controls in the regressions 
will be size, measured as the log of TNA, age, flows, family size, family TNA, turnover ratio, 
expense ratio, active share from the self-reported benchmark, front load and rear load. Pure 
index funds will be excluded from the sample since the comparison is now between active and 
hybrid products. 
For this, different models test different implications. The first regression is a pooled ordinary 
least squares (POLS) without controls. The second specification adds the controls. The third 
model is a POLS of time fixed effects for panel data, so that it isolates performance from 
months in which the general market trend was positive or negative, with standard errors 
clustered by fund. The fourth model is POLS with family and time fixed effects, to control for 
months with abnormal performance and for unobservable family characteristics, such as the 
power of the machines they use, the quality of the trading desk and managers, synergies with 
other funds of the same family, economies of scale, among others. With the family fixed 
effects, one can compare the performance of a hybrid fund against the performance of a non-
hybrid product from the same fund family. On this specification, the family controls used 
previously are dropped because they are all being accounted for on the family fixed effects. In 
specifications three and four, the standard errors are clustered by fund. This prevents a typical 
form of heteroscedasticity present in panel data because, in the dataset used, there are 
unobservable fund characteristics that, with OLS standard errors, create a predictable pattern 
in the errors of the regressions that depends on the cluster which is the fund (Petersen, 2009). 
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The fifth model is a Fama-MacBeth (FMB) model (Fama & MacBeth, 1973) with Newey-West 
robust standard errors that correct for serial correlation (Newey & West, 1987). The FMB 
model has two stages: on the first stage, a regression is performed for each month in the sample; 
on the second stage, the final coefficients estimated are the averages of all the coefficients in 
the first step. Since monthly specific unobservable factors are being left in the residuals of each 
monthly regression, this means that we are isolating the cross-sectional determinants of 
performance to discover which type of funds are likely to perform better. 
One could argue that this approach is not accurate if the idiosyncratic risk of active and EIF 
funds is different given that they may hold positions in very different assets. This is specific 
risk that each asset is exposed to and is captured on the residuals of the factor regressions, such 
as the CAPM or FF. Hence, a Sharpe Ratio (SR) for each fund will be computed using the 
available observations. The SR is equal to the excess fund return over the risk-free rate, divided 
by the fund return volatility. It shows the risk-adjusted return of a financial product: it no longer 
conditions the performance measure to the factors used so it controls for different idiosyncratic 
risk. Then, a t-test between the SR mean of active and hybrid funds will be calculated. 
4.4 Stock Picking and Market Timing Skills 
After discovering if hybrid funds outperform other products or not, it is important to 
disentangle between the results from stock picking and market timing. Stock picking is the 
ability to select stocks that, on average, outperform while market timing shows the ability to 
increase exposure to the benchmark portfolio when the market conditions are good and to 
increase exposure to safer assets, or the risk-free asset, when the market is not favorable. To 
study this, both the Treynor & Mazuy (1966) and the Henriksson & Merton (1981) models will 
be used. These are the most commonly used methods in Finance to discover the 
abovementioned abilities (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016; Weng & Wang, 2017; Zambrana & 
Zapatero, 2015). 
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The Treynor-Mazuy (TM) includes a squared market term to the FF equation while the 
Henriksson-Merton (HM) interacts a market condition dummy with the market risk premium. 
On this thesis, a dummy equal to 1 when the MRP is positive and 0 otherwise will be used. 
Both are designed to split the FF alpha between a market timing component – the new term 
which, if positive, shows increased exposure to the market when the market has better returns 
– and a stock selection component which is the remainder of the FF alpha, captured in this 
model’s own alpha. TM models this in convexity because as MRP increases, the return 
increases more than proportionately due to the squared term while the HM seems like a call 
option outcome that only has value for higher MRP levels. 
On the HM model, one must be careful because it can display heteroscedasticity. One solution 
is using General Least Squares or using the White and Hansen heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors. Breen, Jagannathan & Offer (1986) found that the latter provides the best correction for 
heteroscedasticity so it will be used. 
4.5 Turnover-Performance Relationship 
To test whether hybrid funds become active, i.e. trade more, when they see an opportunity, it 
is important to show the relationship between the turnover ratio and performance. The turnover 
ratio is a measure of activity of a fund since it is the minimum of aggregated sales or purchases 
of securities divided by the average 12-month TNA, as defined by CRSP. 
This section only want to discover if hybrid funds are able to identify and capitalize on 
opportunities, not if they deliver superior returns after fees or if they outperform a benchmark. 
For this reason, the independent variable is gross returns, not net returns or alphas, following 
Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2017). The relevant dependent variable is the lagged turnover. 
A positive coefficient on the lag of turnover indicates that the funds are finding opportunities 
that lead to higher returns in the next month. One limitation of this is the fact that the only 
considered opportunities are discovered in the previous month to the month in which the returns 
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are materialized. Although this should capture the majority of a hybrid fund’s decisions, it 
could be leaving out opportunities that have their return materialized on the same month or that 
take longer than one month. 
The same authors dissect this turnover-performance relationship between time-series and 
cross-sectional dimensions. The first tries to discover if, when one hybrid fund starts trading 
more, it is doing so to capture profit opportunities while the latter may indicate if hybrid funds 
that trade more achieve better performance or if a high turnover is just a strategy to show 
activity to investors. It is well known that the incentives of active, and also hybrid funds, are 
to trade often, otherwise investors will feel that it is best to have their savings parked in a 
passive low-cost fund. 
Instead of mimicking the POLS model of Pástor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2017) a FMB model 
with Newey-West standard errors is used, as well as a POLS with family and time fixed effects 
to check the cross-sectional relation as previously. For the time-series it is a POLS with fund 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors with and without time dummies. The fund fixed 
effects allow for the relationship to be studied for each fund over time. 
4.6 Fund Flows 
To test the final hypothesis, fund flows will be measured as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) and 
Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005): Fund Flows = [TNAt - (1 + rt)TNAt-11]/TNAt  , where TNA is 
total net assets and r is the return over the previous month. One simple way to test it is to create 
a signal when a fund changes its classification from active to hybrid. Given the small number 
of signals, this does not yield consistent estimates. 
To test this hypothesis more accurately, the propensity score matching approach of Cooper, 
Gulen and Rau (2005) is followed. The propensity score consists on estimating a logistic 
regression where the dependent variable is a dummy of 1 when the fund names itself a hybrid 
fund and 0 otherwise. The regressors will be the variables the literature has proven to have an 
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impact on flows. Following Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005), the controls will be size, age, 
lagged flows, 12b-1 fees and the Fama-French alpha. Then, each fund that has changed 
category will be matched with a fund that has not and that has the closest propensity score for 
the characteristics, until a maximum possible difference of 0.1%. The final step is to compute 
the difference in flows between two groups, one with name changes and the other one without. 
All the analysis will be done on Stata. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Hybrid Funds and their mandate 
Hybrid funds have lower active share, higher tracking error and higher turnover ratio than 
active funds. These differences are significant at the 0.1% level as shown in Table 3. Hence, it 
appears that hybrid funds stay true to their mandate because they do not deviate significantly 
from the benchmark, whether we consider the active share with respect to the reported 
benchmark or the benchmark with the smallest active share. Tracking error has the opposite 
interpretation but it may be due to the limitations of this measure, discussed previously. In fact, 
hybrid funds may have higher tracking error than active funds because they are not as 
diversified, they have to stay close to the industries and components of a specific index.  







*	p<0.05 	**	p<0.01 	***	p<0.001 
The result on turnover is more surprising as one would expect hybrid funds to trade very little, 
just enough to capture opportunities they see. One possible explanation is that because they are 
the funds with the lowest TNA, any purchase or sale of securities will have a large impact on 
turnover. Furthermore, if they take large positions on a small set of index components and they 
have to change these bets completely often, then the turnover will become large. 
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5.2 Hybrid Funds versus Passive Investments 
Following with the performance puzzle: doing a t-test on the null hypothesis of hybrid fund’s 
Carhart model alpha lower or equal than 0 against the alternative that alpha is positive has a p-
value of 8.88% with an average alpha of 0.04927%. This means that, at a 10% significance 
level, hybrid funds outperform the benchmark, even after fees. Finally, there appears to be 
some evidence that supports the decision from investors to increase their exposure to these 
hybrid funds. This result is also robust to the other two models used. 
5.3 Hybrid Funds versus Active Investments 
Relative to net performance against active funds, seen in Table 4-Panel A, the alpha of hybrid 
funds without controls nor fixed effects is lower than the alpha of active funds as shown in the 
summary statistics. In POLS without fixed effects but adding controls, it seems that hybrid 
funds deliver superior performance after fees, due to a positive coefficient on the hybrid 
dummy. Hence, hybrid funds seemed worse than active funds because their characteristics are 
not favorable: namely, they are smaller while size affects performance positively. If 
characteristics, which are correlated with performance, are included in the picture, then, ceteris 
paribus, these hybrid products outperform. 
Table 4 - Hybrid Funds' Performance 
Panel	A:	Net	Alphas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
hybrid -0.00084*** -0.00077*** -0.00068*** 0.00033*** 0.00042*** 0.00026*** 0.00064*** 0.00056*** 0.00037** 0.00085*** 0.00080*** 0.00065*** 0.00055*** 0.00043*** 0.00024**
(-25.61) (-24.45) (-22.25) (7.98) (11.48) (7.56) (2.99) (3.03) (2.11) (3.94) (3.95) (3.20) (3.08) (4.29) (2.14)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family	Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Month	F.	E. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes FMB	Model FMB	Model FMB	Model
Family	F.	E. No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes FMB	Model FMB	Model FMB	Model
N 453864 453864 453864 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360 185360
Panel	B:	Gross	Alphas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart CAPM FF Carhart
hybrid -0.00200*** -0.00216*** -0.00220*** 0.00007* 0.00018*** 0.00003 0.00033* 0.00028 0.00010 0.00054** 0.00049** 0.00034 0.00027 0.00016 -0.00002
(-42.62) (-47.83) (-49.87) (1.67) (4.62) (0.82) (1.66) (1.61) (0.60) (2.56) (2.38) (1.61) (1.34) (1.58) (-0.14)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family	Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Month	F.	E. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes FMB	Model FMB	Model FMB	Model
Family	F.	E. No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes FMB	Model FMB	Model FMB	Model
N 248363 248363 248363 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679 180679
t	statistics	in	parentheses
*	p<0.1 	**	p<0.05 	***	p<0.01  
After adding month fixed effects and/or family fixed effects, the results are confirmed. Even 
with the FMB model, there is a statistically significant difference between the alphas of active 
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and hybrid funds: the latter type outperforms the first5. The previous results may be driven by 
the higher fees charged by active funds. An analysis to gross alphas in Table 4-Panel B 
confirms it. Although there is mild evidence of higher alphas in POLS with time fixed effects 
and with or without family fixed-effects, this disappears in the FMB model. Therefore, hybrid 
funds are creating more value than active funds, due to the lower fees they charge. Thus, the 
results achieved by previous literature are not being confirmed on this larger and more efficient 
US market: on aggregate, hybrid funds are better than a passive investment on a benchmark 
proxy and, after fees, they are also better than active funds. 
By regressing the alphas on fund characteristic, one can see that hybrid funds that are older, in 
larger families and that trade more seem to perform better. In fact, if the analysis is repeated 
but only considering the quartile with the largest families in number of funds, then the 
economic significance of the results increases6, showing synergies between funds. 
The SR of hybrid funds is also higher, on average, than the SR of active funds. This means that 
hybrid funds have higher risk-adjusted returns. The average difference between these fund 
types is 0.0473 and is statistically significant at the 0.01% significance level which confirms 
the previous results. 
5.4 Stock Picking and Market Timing Skills 
These performance measures can be split into market timing and stock selection skills using 
the TM and HM with White standard errors models. Both models yield consistent and 
statistically significant results: although hybrid funds are good market timers, since the market 
coefficient is positive, they are not able to select well the stocks in their portfolio. The models 
have opposite signs for the constant that signals stock selection but none is significant. As 
                                                
5 The same analysis was done using the OAR, but including all types of funds and style dummies. A positive alpha 
is discovered but it is only significant at the 10% level in POLS with fixed effect and not significant in the FMB. 
This result may be due to the very specific investment objectives: it is unlikely that, inside each style, some funds 
dramatically outperform others. Results, split by sector, are shown in the appendix. 
6 The coefficients on the hybrid dummies increase. Results shown in the appendix. 
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argued previously, a pure index fund cannot hedge against seasons where the index they track 
is likely to behave poorly. Hybrid funds, however, are able to decrease their exposure to the 
index. At least, they can reduce their positions on the securities most affected by the downturn. 
The lack of stock selection ability may follow from human capital theory. Maybe the managers 
hired to run hybrid funds are not good stock pickers themselves so this will not be the fund’s 
comparative advantage. 












5.5 Turnover-Performance Relationship 
Next, let us try to discover if a hybrid fund is finding and capitalizing on opportunities 
discovered. From a cross-sectional perspective, using the FMB model or family and month 
fixed effects, models 1 and 2 of Table 6 respectively, there is no evidence of an increase in 
gross returns after a turnover increase.  
Interestingly, in a time series approach with fund fixed effects and without a dummy for each 
month, turnover positively affects gross return but the lag of turnover negatively affects it. This 
provides support to the fact that the opportunities that arise to hybrid funds have a short-term 
character since they are discovered and have returns on the same period. On a longer time span, 
the opportunity effect vanishes and as the opportunity, perhaps some inefficiency on a stock 
price, disappears or reverts, we observe a negative turnover-performance relationship. This is 
consistent with the idea that hybrid funds add more value around index change periods given 
that they provide return opportunities on the very short term. 
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Table 6 - Turnover-Performance Relationship 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover -0.17382 -0.00079 0.00599** 0.00173
(-0.47) (-0.67) (2.12) (1.10)
Lag	of	Turnover 0.17348 -0.00026 -0.00487* -0.00196
(0.47) (-0.22) (-1.76) (-1.26)
N 14177 14177 14177 14177
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family	F.E. FMB	Model Yes No No
Month	F.E. FMB	Model Yes No Yes
Fund	F.E. FMB	Model No Yes Yes
t	statistics	in	parentheses
*	p<0.1,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01  
5.6 Fund Flows 
After a fund names itself a hybrid fund, there is an increase in inflows on that month and on 
the following couple of months but this POLS with signal is not significant for 152 cases. This 
result is significant using a logit on the one-to-one propensity score matching. A newly 
instituted hybrid fund does experience added inflows with respect to an otherwise similar fund. 
Perhaps, investors are aware that hybrid funds are likely to perform better so they invest more 
on a newly named hybrid fund just because of the type change.  
The results are shown in Table 7, robust to different procedures except for the radius matching 
when a fund is matched with all funds inside of the 0.1% score difference. Since the score 
difference is small, these are very similar funds that should not have difference in inflows, 
corroborated with the Radius matching. All in all, evidence is mixed but ultimately investors 
are not increasing inflows to these funds just because of the change in type. 









In conclusion, this thesis refuted the results that previous literature had achieved and added 
some insights on the determinants of hybrid fund performance, the turnover-performance 
relationship and on the way investors look at these funds. It is different because, on aggregate, 
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it found that hybrid funds outperform their benchmarks, which is likely to have happened due 
to the more extensive and efficient dataset used. It discovered strong evidence of hybrid funds 
achieving higher alphas than active funds. Looking at gross alphas, the results vanish. There 
was only weak evidence to support the claim that, before fees, hybrid funds generate higher 
alphas than active funds. Nevertheless, they generate a positive alpha, so they are better than 
their benchmarks and after fees they are better than active funds. 
This thesis added further insights in the sense that it discovered that hybrid funds are poor stock 
pickers but are able to time well the market. Furthermore, it proved that hybrid funds are able 
to discover short-term opportunities to become active that improve their returns within the 
same month such as index changes. Finally, there is mixed evidence if investors channel more 
inflows to hybrid funds when they self-report themselves as an enhanced index or index based 
fund, so it is not certain if they are chasing these products or if the marketing of hybrid funds 
is working well. 
On the one hand, it seems that some hybrid funds can outperform their benchmarks and provide 
the right combination of active and passive strategies although it would be very ambitious to 
claim these are the future of investing. On the other hand, it also appears that hybrid funds are 
not dramatically better and can only capitalize on short-term opportunities. 
Future research should build on newer datasets with more hybrid fund observations or divide 
the data by different periods. It should also study more in depth the marketing of these hybrid 
funds, if investors are really aware of their characteristics by using fund prospectuses. 
Furthermore, it could exploit deeper the economic significance of the results: if the magnitude 
of the differences is large enough so that investors will use more hybrid funds on their 
portfolios. On this thesis, due to time constraints, there was no manual check if a fund reported 
by CRSP as a hybrid fund is really hybrid. Nevertheless, this study was able to shed light on 
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